U.K. Implements 25% “Google Tax” on Diverted Profits

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The U.K. has implemented the controversial diverted profits tax on the profits of multinational companies that are “artificially diverted” from activity within the country. This 25% levy became effective on profits arising on or after April 1, 2015. At this point, it is unclear whether the outcome of the Parliamentary election on May 7 will impact the enforcement of the diverted profits tax, which was enacted without thorough examination by Parliament.

U.K. officials claim multinational corporations are manipulating the tax system and have imposed the 25% levy to prevent companies from avoiding a taxable presence in the U.K. This corporate diversions tax is aimed at entities that transfer profits to lower tax jurisdictions, away from the U.K. The diverted profits tax is being called the “Google tax” because it addresses the practices of well-known international entities such as Google Inc., Amazon.com Inc., and Starbucks Corp. that have used the U.K.’s permanent establishment and economic substance rules to craft tax advantages within the bounds of the law. Legislators have held hearings within the last year on how these three companies in particular have been able to generate billions of dollars in revenue in the U.K. but report little or no taxable profits.

The U.K. tax authority, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (“H.M.R.C.”), introduced a draft of the diverted profits tax last fall and quickly implemented the legislation ahead of the May 7 election. There is great concern about the legislation’s complexity and that its hasty enactment will only result in future revisions, which will further complicate the matter. On the whole, the government is targeting transactions that it does not favor even though they are legal, and the tax itself is being criticized for undermining the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project executed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

An American Solution to Offshore Tax Evasion

Volume 2 No 5    /    Read Article

By Robert J. Alter (guest author)

The United States Department of Justice Tax Division and the I.R.S. have been ramping up an intense crackdown on offshore tax evasion, and while new budget cuts have vastly reduced I.R.S. resources, the cutbacks are having no effect on I.R.S. enforcement initiatives in this area. Robert J. Alter of McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter discusses the U.S. crackdown on offshore tax evasion and the various programs available to rectify noncompliance, including the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program, Streamlined Procedures, Delinquent International Information Return Submission Procedures, and Delinquent F.B.A.R. Submission Procedures.   See more →

Transfer Pricing Implications of the B.E.P.S. Action Plan

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Determined to eliminate so-called “double non-taxation,” as well as no or low taxation, associated with practices that are perceived to segregate taxable income from the activities that generate them, the Group of Twenty (“G20”) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) released their Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“B.E.P.S. Action Plan”) in 2013. Included in the B.E.P.S. Action Plan are several provisions related to transfer pricing:

• Action 4: Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments;
• Action 8: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Intangibles;
• Action 9: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Risks and capital;
• Action 10: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation – Other high-risk transactions; and
• Action 13: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation.

The O.E.C.D. has since delivered a number of reports and recommendations related to these actions, including revisions to the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (“Transfer Pricing Guidelines”), and it continues to perform additional work on deliverables scheduled for later this year.

The Italian Voluntary Disclosure

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INTRODUCTION

Italy has a long history of tax amnesty programs established under a broad variety of names and rules. Interestingly, every new program has been described as “the last chance” for tax evaders to comply with the Italian tax code. It is no wonder that, as in all prior cases, Italy’s most recent voluntary disclosure program (the “V.D.”) has been defined as the “last call.” Having said that, and sensitive to prior performance, we firmly believe that for a wide range of reasons the V.D. will truly be the last opportunity for Italian citizens and residents to get their tax matters in order.

One indicator is heightened criticism of the typical Italian de facto tolerance toward tax evasion, which is now being blamed for the country’s ongoing economic crisis. Accordingly, the war against tax havens, as initiated by the U.S. under F.A.T.C.A. and subsequent inter-governmental agreements, has changed the way the whole world approaches such matters. Today, there is a new sensitivity toward tax compliance and no discernable government or media tolerance towards tax avoidance.

In addition, a different approach is now being taken with respect to tax amnesty matters. In the past, there was a sort of “reward” for the penitent evaders. Such individuals were granted the opportunity to regularize their positions by paying a low flat-rate extraordinary tax. The V.D. is different. Under the new provisions of the Law n. 186, dated December 15, 2014, (the “V.D. Act”), a taxpayer who enters the V.D. procedure (“V.D. Applicant”) will be required to pay every single euro of unpaid tax; the only benefit lies in the reduction of penalties, which are less than those applicable in an ordinary tax audit procedure.

The Future of Ireland as a Place to Carry On Business in Light of Recent E.U. & O.E.C.D. Initiatives

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INTRODUCTION

Ireland has long been established as the onshore location of choice for the world’s leading multinational enterprises (“M.N.E.’s”). Although Ireland’s attractiveness as a location for foreign direct investment is based on a number of factors, the low corporate tax rate of 12.5% is crucial.

Ireland’s corporate tax regime has received persistent and pervasive scrutiny from international media in recent times, focusing on topics such as the “Double Irish,” the O.E.C.D. B.E.P.S. initiative, and the Apple investigation. What must not be forgotten in the midst of such coverage is that Ireland has nothing to hide and nothing to fear from any of the above issues. Ireland is a small jurisdiction, and as far back as the 1950’s, the cornerstone of the economy has been foreign direct investment (“F.D.I.”).

Ireland makes no secret of its wish to compete with other jurisdictions for F.D.I., and its highly competitive corporate tax regime, including the 12.5% tax rate, forms part of a broader strategy that allows Ireland to “play to win.”

This article will discuss some of the main O.E.C.D. and E.U. initiatives impacting Ireland and the effects such initiatives are likely to have on Ireland and the M.N.E.’s which are based here.

Deoffshorization in Russia: C.F.C. Legislation Comes into Effect

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Federal law No. 376 of November 24, 2014, On Amendments to Part One and Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation (concerning the taxation of controlled foreign companies and foreign organizations), and commonly referred to as the “C.F.C. Law,” came into force on January 1, 2015. It marks the beginning of deoffshorization of the Russian economy and introduces entirely new tax rules for Russian businesses having affiliates based outside Russia.

The C.F.C. Law introduces the following three new legal concepts, previously nonexistent in Russian tax legislation:

• Controlled foreign company (“C.F.C.”),
• Russian tax residence for foreign companies, and
• Beneficial owner of income.

The C.F.C. Law establishes the obligation of taxpayers to notify the tax authorities of their participation in foreign entities. It also establishes rules for computing and taxing C.F.C. profit and share transactions of companies that own real estate in Russia. It provides for recognition of foreign non-corporate structures (such as trusts, private foundations, partnerships, etc.) as separate taxpayers.

Following the O.E.C.D. lead in the B.E.P.S. proposals, these amendments have two broad goals: (i) they ensure business transparency and (ii) they combat the use of low-tax jurisdictions to obtain unjustified tax benefits.

CONTROLLED FOREIGN COMPANIES

A controlled foreign company is a foreign entity (or non-corporate structure) that is:

1. Not a tax resident of the Russian Federation and
2. Controlled by Russian tax residents, either legal entities or individuals (“Controlling Persons”).

Corporate Matters: Is Your Deal Safe? How the F.C.P.A. Affects Mergers & Acquisitions

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Foreign-based companies that do not do business in the United States might understandably ask how the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“F.C.P.A.”) can impact them. The answer is unexpectedly and profoundly – if the foreign company becomes an acquisition target of a U.S. company.

As 2015 begins, it is no longer news to anyone that a U.S. company doing business abroad must have a robust anti-corruption and anti-fraud compliance program. An effective compliance program can prevent F.C.P.A. problems from arising or, if such problems do arise, reduce a company’s penalties. It is equally important to remember that the F.C.P.A. can have as significant an impact on a company’s merger and acquisition transactions as it can on its everyday operations. For that reason, a foreign company looking to partner with, or be acquired by, a U.S.-based entity, must make sure that its conduct does not adversely affect or jeopardize such efforts. Recent developments in 2014, as well as past history, illustrate this point.

The F.C.P.A. plays a significant role in mergers and acquisitions. An acquiring company is expected to conduct due diligence to ascertain the acquired entity’s F.C.P.A. compliance. If in the course of that due diligence, the acquiring company uncovers violations by the entity to be acquired, it is expected to disclose them and remedy them. Otherwise, it risks F.C.P.A. liability of its own. In guidance issued in 2012, the D.O.J. warned:

[A] company that does not perform adequate FCPA due diligence prior to a merger or acquisition may face both legal and business risks. Perhaps most commonly, inadequate due diligence can allow a course of bribery to continue—with all the attendant harms to a business’s profitability and reputation, as well as potential civil and criminal liability.

The Proposed United Kingdom "Diverted Profits Tax"

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INTRODUCTION

The United Kingdom proposes to introduce, on profits arising as of April 1, 2015, a “Diverted Profits Tax.” This is intended to override the normal international tax arrangements when H.M.R.C. (the U.K. tax authority) does not like the outcome. Domestic laws, O.E.C.D. practice, and a network of Double Tax Agreements provide a definition of “Permanent Establishment” defining what income is or is not taxable within the country of operation. Similarly, “Transfer Pricing” rules should enable the tax authorities to ensure that the price used for transactions between related entities is appropriate for calculating proper division of taxable revenue between the countries concerned. While many believe that these are not working as well as they should, the problems need a more subtle and sophisticated solution rather than a blunderbuss approach.

The “Diverted Profits Tax,” at a rate of 25% (mildly penal, compared with the Corporation Tax rate of 21%), is to be imposed if H.M.R.C. does not like the answer produced by these well-established procedures and succeeds in claiming, under this new law, that profits have, nevertheless, been “diverted.” The draft legislation sets out very detailed rules. These are available on the H.M.R.C. website, but those who follow matters very closely would be well-advised to continue to examine the extensive comments that are being made. The draft legislation gets very close to giving H.M.R.C. the power to determine unilaterally the level of taxable income. “Tax by administrative discretion” is a policy normally associated with authoritarian or left-wing governments. The United Kingdom may well, post-election, have a leftwing government who will be delighted to be presented with what, to them, is a very attractive measure.

APPROPRIATE STRATEGIES FOR AFFECTED BUSINESSES

What do those affected by the draft legislation and their advisers need to do or know? The provisions will not apply to S.M.E.’s, i.e., groups with less than £10 million of annual sales within the U.K. Others will need to consider their position very carefully and make contingency plans on the assumption that the provisions will be enacted, although perhaps in a substantially amended form. H.M.R.C. forecasts that the measure will eventually bring in £350 million per annum, but goes on to say that it “is not expected to have a significant economic impact.” American readers in particular will be well aware that there is a huge gap between the initially-forecast yield of a tax avoidance measure and the outcome. Hastily proposed and badly designed tax legislation is often more successful at creating economic damage than producing revenue or desirable changes in activities.