Action Item 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties

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AN EXERCISE IN “POINT/COUNTERPOINT”

Implementation of many of the B.E.P.S. Action Items would require amending or otherwise modifying international tax treaties. According to the O.E.C.D., the sheer number of bilateral tax treaties makes updating the current treaty network highly burdensome. Therefore, B.E.P.S. Action Item 15 recommends the development of a multilateral instrument (“M.L.I.”) to enable countries to easily implement measures developed through the B.E.P.S. initiative and to amend existing treaties. Without a mechanism for swift implementation of the Action Items, changes to model tax conventions merely widen the gap between the content of the models and the content of actual tax treaties.

Discussion of Action Item 15 has centered on the following issues:

• Whether an M.L.I. is necessary,
• Whether an M.L.I. is feasible, and
• Whether an M.L.I. is legal.

In the spirit of these ongoing discussions concerning Action Item 15, we offer our commentary in a “point/counterpoint” format.

Action Item 13: Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-by-Country Reporting

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INTRODUCTION

On July 19, 2013, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) released its full Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (the “B.E.P.S. Action Plan”), with expectations to roll out specific items over the subsequent two years. According to the O.E.C.D., the B.E.P.S. Action Plan will allow countries to draft coordinated, comprehensive, and transparent standards that governments need to prevent B.E.P.S., while at the same time updating the current rules to reflect modern business practices. Of the 15 action items listed in the B.E.P.S. Action Plan, four relate specifically to transfer pricing and several others indirectly address this area, as well. The four with direct impact on transfer pricing are Action Items 8, 9, 10, and 13:

• Action Items 8, 9, and 10 (Assure that Transfer Pricing Outcomes are in Line with Value Creation) develop rules to prevent B.E.P.S. by (i) adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles; (ii) ensuring that profits associated with the transfer and use of intangibles, capital, or other high-risk transactions are appropriately allocated in accordance with value creation; (iii) developing transfer pricing rules for transfers of hard-to-value intangibles; and (iv) updating the guidance on cost contribution arrangements.
• Action Item 13 (Re-examine Transfer Pricing Documentation) develops rules regarding transfer pricing documentation to enhance transparency for tax administrations, taking into consideration the compliance costs for multinationals.

With these and the 11 other Action Items, the O.E.C.D. aims to foster (i) coherence of corporate income taxation at the national level; (ii) enhanced substance, through bilateral tax treaties an in transfer pricing; and (iii) transparency and consistency of requirements.

Action Item 8: Changes to the Transfer Pricing Rules in Relation to Intangibles - Phase I

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INTRODUCTION

Unlike some of the other B.E.P.S Action Items, Action Item 8 has a basis in existing O.E.C.D. rules. In this regard, the O.E.C.D. Transfer Pricing Guidelines41 have established the operating rules for transfer pricing. It is understandable that Action Item 8 merely presents a series of amendments to Chapters I, II, and VI of the O.E.C.D. Guidelines.

Action Item 8 states that it seeks to:

• Clarify the definition of I.P.,
• Provide guidance on identifying transactions involving I.P., and
• Provide supplemental guidance for determining arm’s length conditions for transactions involving I.P.

Action Item 8 also considers the treatment of local market features and corporate synergies.

Action Item 6: Attacking Treaty Shopping

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BACKGROUND

Action Item 6 addresses abuse of treaties, particularly focusing on treaty shopping as one of the most important sources of B.E.P.S. The approach adopted amends the O.E.C.D. Model Convention that borrows from the U.S.'s approach to treaties but expands upon it in a way that can be very helpful to the U.S. and other developed countries if adopted by the C.F.E. next year in their final report. Among other measures, the report recommends inclusion of a Limitation on Benefits (“L.O.B.”) provision and a general anti-avoidance rule called the Principal Purpose Test (“P.P.T.”) to be included in the O.E.C.D. Model Convention. While it is expected the report will be finalized next year, whether countries will adopt the recommendations is the crucial factor that is still unclear.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The key recommendations can be found in Paragraph 14. It contains two basic recommendations:

• Countries should agree to include in the tax treaties an express statement of the common intention to eliminate double taxation without creating opportunities for non-taxation or reduced taxation through tax evasion or avoidance through use of treaties.
• Countries should demonstrate their commitment to this goal by adopting an L.O.B. provision and a P.P.T. provision in income tax treaties.

The report also notes that special rules may be needed to address application of these rules to collective investment funds (“C.I.F.’s”). The provision should be supplemented by a mechanism that would deal with conduit arrangements not currently dealt with in tax treaties.

Action Item 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively

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The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) worked together with G20 countries to develop a 15-point action plan to deal with Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“B.E.P.S.”). The goal of the B.E.P.S. Action Plan is to develop a single global standard for automatic exchange of information and stop corporations from shifting profits to jurisdictions with little or no tax in order to ensure taxation in the jurisdiction where profit-generating economic activities are performed and where value is created.

B.E.P.S. occurs in situations where different tax laws interact in a way that creates extremely low global tax rates or results in double non-taxation. This kind of planning gives a competitive advantage to multinational entities that have substantial budgets to engage high-powered tax advisers and to implement their plans.

The O.E.C.D. published deliverables that intend to eliminate double non-taxation resulting from B.E.P.S. The final measures will be completed in 2015 and will be implemented either through domestic law or the existing network of bilateral tax treaties.

ACTION ITEM 5: HARMFUL TAX PRACTICE

Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue

In 1998, the O.E.C.D. published the report Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue (“the 1998 Report”) with the intention of developing methods to prevent harmful tax practices with respect to geographically mobile activities. These methods have been adopted in the Forum on Harmful Tax Practice (“F.H.T.P.”) with some modifications. Significant attention is given to:

• Elaborating on a methodology to define a substantial activity requirement in the context of intangible regimes; and
• Improving transparency through compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes.

Action Item 2: Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements

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On the heels of the discussion drafts issued in March, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) released the initial components of its plan to fight base erosion and profit shifting (the “B.E.P.S. Action Plan”). Action Item 2 addresses the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements and proposes plans to neutralize the tax deficits caused.

These responses aim to tackle the following issues created by the hybrid mismatch arrangements:

• Reduction in overall tax revenue,
• Unfair advantage given to multinational taxpayers with access to sophisticated tax-planning expertise, and
• Increased expense often incurred in setting up hybrid arrangements compared to domestic structures.

This article introduces the different hybrid arrangements, looks at the proposed changes in both domestic law and international tax treaties, and discusses the ripple effect this could have if implemented.

INTRODUCTION

A hybrid mismatch arrangement is one that exploits a difference in the way an entity or instrument is taxed under different jurisdictions to yield a mismatch in total tax liability incurred by the parties. The two possible mismatches that could result are either a “double deduction” (“DD”) or a deduction that is not offset in any jurisdiction by ordinary income (“D/NI”). These mismatches are brought about by the different interpretations afforded to the entities and transactions in relevantjurisdictions. The root cause of the hybrid mismatch is that an entity may be a “hybrid entity” and an instrument may be a “hybrid instrument.” Understanding the different hybrid arrangements is instrumental to understanding the plan proposed by the O.E.C.D.

Action Item 1: The O.E.C.D.'s Approach to the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy

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The O.E.C.D.’s Action Plan adopted in Saint Petersburg in 2013 aims at tracking where economic activities generating taxable profits are performed and where value is created. It aims at ensuring that taxation follows the economic activities and the creation of value and not the other way around. Action Item 1 of the Action Plan (the “Action 1 Deliverable”) focuses on the tax challenges of the digital economy. Along with the 2014 Deliverable on Action 15 (Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax Treaties), the Action 1 Deliverable is a final report.

The Action 1 Deliverable published on September 16, 2014 mainly reiterates the March 2014 Public Discussion Draft on Action 1 (click here to access our article on the 2014 Public Discussion Draft). It restates that, while B.E.P.S. is exacerbated in the digital economy space, the digital economy cannot be ring-fenced from other sectors of the economy for B.E.P.S. purposes because the digital economy is an ever growing portion of the entire economy. The Action 1 Deliverable thus refers to other Actions to address common B.E.P.S. issues that are not specific to the digital economy. Action Item 1 also refers to the O.E.C.D.’s International V.A.T./G.S.T. Guidelines with regard to V.A.T. issues raised by the digital economy. Although the Action 1 Deliverable adds relatively little to the previously published Public Discussion Draft on Action Item 1, the benefit of a set of uniformly accepted rules should not be understated. With European countries struggling to raise tax revenue in order to close budget gaps, the risk of adverse unilateral action by one or more countries is real. During a symposium held in Rome at the beginning of the month, certain European countries, and especially Italy, pushed for unilateral action with regard to the taxation of the digital economy. If that action proceeds to enactment, digital tax chaos could be encountered.

Israeli Law Confronts International Tax Treaties and Principles Via New Treatment of Mixed-Beneficiary Trusts

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HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF ISRAELI TAXING MODELS IN RESPECT OF NON-ISRAELI TRUSTS

Pre-2006 Situation – the Corporate Model

Israel has come a long way in its efforts to tax foreign-established trusts, which historically were assumed to have been used to shelter Israeli-source funds of high net worth Israeli residents and their families. Prior to the adoption of any relevant comprehensive Israeli tax legislation in 2006, the practice consisted mostly of viewing trusts and beneficiaries similarly to corporations and shareholders.

Thus, under customary Israeli international tax rules, if the “management and control” of the non-Israeli trust was effected outside of Israel, the trust was considered to be nonresident because the trust’s assets were situated outside of Israel and the trustees had full discretion over their control. No formal powers were exercised directly or indirectly by Israeli beneficiaries. Hence, the trust was simply not subject to Israeli taxation. Moreover, discretionary distributions were viewed as tax-free gifts. In this way, wealthy Israelis could cause foreign trusts to be funded by Israeli-source wealth and invested outside Israel without subjecting the resulting income to Israeli tax.

Israel has neither an estate/inheritance tax nor a gift tax, which means that bona fide gifts and inheritances are free of tax for both the donor or the decedent and the recipient. Thus, a foreign trust ostensibly became the perfect Israeli tax planning tool. Assets could be donated by an Israeli settlor to a foreign irrevocable discretionary trust for the benefit of family members. Legally, the assets were no longer owned by the Israeli donor but rather by a foreign body managed and controlled by a foreign trustee. Therefore, the trust’s non-Israeli assets and income were outside the scope of Israeli taxation. Distributions by these trusts to Israeli resident beneficiaries that were bona fide discretionary gifts were exempt in the hands of an Israeli recipient.

Insights Vol. 1 No. 8: Updates & Other Tidbits

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U.K. WINDFALL WINDING DOWN

After an arduous path through the courts regarding the creditability of the U.K. windfall tax, the Third Circuit followed the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court and found the tax to be creditable in a case involve PPL Corp.

The U.S. and foreign countries can tax foreign-sourced income of U.S. taxpayers. To lessen the economic cost of double taxation, U.S. taxpayers are allowed to deduct or credit foreign taxes in computing income or net tax due. The amount of the U.S. income tax that can be offset by a credit cannot exceed the proportion attributable to net foreign source income. Code §901(b) specifies that a foreign credit is allowed only if the nature of the foreign tax is similar to the U.S. income tax and is imposed on net gain.

The U.S. entity PPL is a global energy company producing, selling, and delivering electricity through its subsidiaries. South Western Electricity PLC (“SWEB”), a U.K. private limited company, was an indirect subsidiary that was liable for windfall tax in the U.K. Windfall tax is a 23% tax on the gain from a company’s public offering value when the company was previously owned by the U.K. government. When SWEB paid its windfall liability, PPL claimed a Code §901 foreign tax credit. This was denied by the I.R.S. and the long and winding litigation commenced.

Initially, the Tax Court found the windfall tax to be of the same character as the U.S. income tax. The decision was reversed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the tax was neither an income tax, nor a war profits tax, nor an excess profits tax. It took into consideration in determining the tax base an amount greater than gross receipts. Then, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the predominant character of the windfall tax is an excess profits tax based on net income. Therefore, it was creditable. In August, the Third Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s decision and ordered that the original decision in the Tax Court should be affirmed.

The U.S.-Sweden I.G.A.: A Practitioner's Perspective

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Sweden recently entered into an intergovernmental agreement (“I.G.A.”) with the U.S. to address the application of F.A.T.C.A. to Swedish financial institutions. The subsequent modifications to Swedish law to accommodate the I.G.A. were made public on August 11, 2014 in a proposal by the Ministry of Finance. The proposal added numerous modifications to the requirements for compliance and published the reporting forms that will be due starting next year. The complexity of F.A.T.C.A. compliance will trigger a number of changes in many areas of Swedish legislation, which are likely to be approved by the Swedish Parliament in the fall of 2014. It is clear that F.A.T.C.A. will make life more complex for the regulated groups.

F.A.T.C.A. will have a broad, sweeping effect on Swedish financial institutions (“F.I.’s”), including large Swedish banks, insurance companies, and private equity companies. These F.I.’s have been planning for F.A.T.C.A. and have implemented technology, procedures, and training that have caused them to incur in significant costs. However, based on personal experience, it appears that there is a large group of “institutions” that do not understand that they are in fact F.I.’s and must act accordingly. Recently, when discussing due diligence procedures mandated by F.A.T.C.A. with management of a Swedish permanent establishment, the response was simply “thanks for the heads up,” which indicated that the compliance requirements were not yet on the company’s radar.

Some of these institutions may revert to the simplest solution – barring Americans from being accepted as investors or account holders. This solution, however, is suboptimal for an F.I. as it eliminates a large group of Swedish/U.S. dual citizens from the client base. Of greater importance is the fact that barring Americans does not mean an institution can ignore F.A.T.C.A. F.A.T.C.A. requires disclosure of U.S.-controlled foreign entities that may be account holders at these institutions, a task that will require creating new on-boarding procedures and a review of all preexisting accounts.

Insights Vol. 1 No. 8: F.A.T.C.A. 24/7

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ISRAEL IS BECOMING THE I.R.S.'S STRICTEST ENFORCER OF F.A.T.C.A.

On May 4, 2014 Israel reached a Model 1 agreement with the U.S. Israel has shown a strong eagerness to accept F.A.T.C.A. In 2012, the Association of Banks in Israel urged the country's central bank, the Bank of Israel, to ask the government to reach a F.A.T.C.A. agreement with the United States. Earlier in 2014, even before the signing of the F.A.T.C.A. agreement, the Bank of Israel ordered Israeli financial institutions to begin to implement F.A.T.C.A. procedures, including appointing an officer to oversee F.A.T.C.A. compliance, identifying U.S. customers, making them sign I.R.S. declarations (such as I.R.S. Form W-9 or Form W-8BEN), and expelling any clients unwilling to do so. Israel has shown strong support and an eagerness to uphold the enforcement of F.A.T.C.A.

The Israeli Ministry of Finance has drafted proposed regulations that would impose criminal penalties on Israeli financial institutions (including banks, brokerage houses, and insurance companies) that do not comply with F.A.T.C.A. reporting obligations.

CANADIANS CHALLENGE F.A.T.C.A. AGREEMENT

On August 11, through the Alliance for the Defense of Canadian Sovereignty, two U.S.-born Canadians filed a lawsuit against the Canadian government asserting that the Canadian I.G.A. was unconstitutional.

A statement of claim at the Federal Court of Canada in Vancouver was filed against the defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, contesting the Model 1 reciprocal I.G.A. that Canada and the United States signed on February 5.

Corporate Matters: Delaware or New York L.L.C.?

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When a client is considering commencing business operations in New York, we are often asked whether it is preferable to form a limited liability company (“L.L.C.”) in New York or in Delaware. As we have mentioned in a previous issues, Delaware is generally the preferred jurisdiction for incorporation and the jurisdiction we typically recommend.

We thought it might be helpful to set out a short summary of issues that one will encounter in choosing between a New York or a Delaware L.L.C. and the relevant advantages and disadvantages of using either state.

Filing Fees

The fee for filing the articles of organization for a New York L.L.C. is $200, while the fee for filing a certificate of formation in Delaware is only $90.00. However, if the Delaware L.L.C. intends to conduct business in New York, it must file an application of authority for a foreign limited liability company, accompanied with a certificate of good standing from Delaware.

The determination of whether the Delaware L.L.C. is conducting business in New York is largely fact specific. The filing fee for the application for authority is $250, and the Delaware fee for a certificate of good standing can range from $50 (for a short form certificate) to $175 (for a long form certificate).

I.R.S. Issues New Form 1023-EZ: Streamlined Exemption for Small Charities

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On July 1, 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) introduced a new, shorter application form to help small public charities apply for recognition of tax-exempt status, under §501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (“the Code”), more easily.

Ruchelman P.L.L.C. used the new Form 1023-EZ, Streamlined Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, for a client and received recognition of tax-exempt status in less than three weeks. Recognition of tax-exempt status ordinarily can take months, if not years (in the case of charities operating abroad). Prior to the introduction of Form 1023-EZ, expedited processing was available only under certain circumstances, generally in the case of a mass disaster (e.g., terrorist attack, hurricane, etc.).

The new procedures may reduce the need for small charities to engage in fiscal sponsorships with larger public charities. Under a fiscal sponsorship, the larger charity agrees to sponsor the start-up charity, receiving and administering charitable contributions on behalf of the sponsored organization, for a fee.

The new Form 1023-EZ, is three pages long, compared with the standard 26-page Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Most small organizations (which the I.R.S. estimates to be as many as 70% of all applicants) qualify to use the new streamlined form. Most organizations with gross receipts of $50,000 or less and assets of $250,000 or less are eligible. These are the same organizations that are eligible to file an “ePostcard” annual return on Form 990-N.

The Form 1023-EZ must be filed using pay.gov (the secure electronic portal for making payments to Federal Government Agencies) and a $400 user fee is due at the time the form is submitted.

Current Tax Court Litigation Illustrates Intangible Property Transfer Pricing and Valuation Issues

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MOVING INTANGIBLE PPROPERTY ASSETS OVERSEAS PRESENTS BOTH BUSINESS AND TAX ISSUES

The movement of intangible property (“I.P.”) offshore by U.S. multinational corporations has always been subject to high levels of I.R.S. scrutiny. This remains true in the current tax environment. It is a given that U.S. multinational companies are subject to a high level of U.S. corporate income tax at federal and state levels and their non-U.S. business operations are typically subject to lower tax rates abroad. As a result, U.S. multinationals can lower their global tax expense by transferring I.P. to an offshore subsidiary company (“I.P. Company”), when it is appropriate and consistent with the conduct of their international business operations.

In a typical arrangement within a group, the I.P. Company licenses the use of the I.P. to other members. Royalties paid by the other group members (including the U.S. parent, if total ownership of the I.P. is assumed by the I.P. Company) is claimed as a deduction in the tax jurisdictions of each member that is a licensee. If an I.P. Box Company arrangement is in place or a special ruling obtained, the royalties received by the I.P. Company will be subject to a low tax rate. Assuming that arrangements are in place to remove the royalty income from the category of Foreign Personal Holding Company Income for purposes of Subpart F, the net result is reduced tax for book and tax purposes. This yields greater profits for the multinational group and increased value for its shareholders.

Two cases that are currently in litigation illustrate the I.R.S. scrutiny given to transfers of I.P. to an I.P. Company and the resulting U.S. tax issues that are encountered. The cases involve Zimmer Holdings and Medtronic.

Tax 101: Updates to Procedures Relating to Withholding Foreign Partnership or Trust Agreements as a Result of F.A.T.C.A.

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Chapter 3 of the Internal Revenue Code requires withholding on payments of certain types. These include “fixed or determinable annual or periodic income” (“F.D.A.P.”) to foreign persons, disposition of U.S. real property interests by foreign persons, and U.S. effectively connected income attributable to foreign partners of a partnership engaged in a U.S. trade or business. Historically, withholding agreements allowed a foreign partnership or trust to become a Withholding Foreign Partnership (“W.P.”) or a Withholding Foreign Trust (“W.T.”) and to assume the withholding and reporting responsibilities of a withholding agent under Chapter 3.

Chapter 4 of the Internal Revenue Code (regarding F.A.T.C.A.) generally requires foreign financial institutions (“F.F.I.’s”) to provide information to the Internal Revenue Service (“I.R.S.”) with regard to account holders who are U.S. persons. Chapter 4 also requires certain non-financial foreign entities (“N.F.F.E.’s”) to provide information on their substantial U.S. owners to withholding agents. Chapter 4 imposes a withholding tax on certain payments to F.F.I.’s and N.F.F.E.’s that fail to comply with their F.A.T.C.A. obligations. (For a more detailed discussion of F.A.T.C.A., please see our Insights monthly F.A.T.C.A. 24/7 column.)

On August 8, 2014, the I.R.S. released Rev. Proc. 2014-47, which provides guidance on entering into W.P. and W.T. agreements and for renewing such agreements under F.A.T.C.A., thereby essentially integrating the two reporting systems. Rev. Proc. 2014-17 permits a W.P. and W.T. to assume the withholding and reporting responsibilities of a withholding agent under both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Rev. Proc. 2014-47 publishes revised W.P. and W.T. agreement procedures, which apply to W.P. and W.T. agreements effective on or after June 30, 2014. Additionally, existing W.P. and W.T. agreements are updated to coordinate with the withholding and reporting requirements of F.A.T.C.A.

Inbound Investment in German Real Estate

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INTRODUCTION

Investments in German real estate are attractive to international investors. Low interest rates and positive economic conditions exist in Germany. The demand for commercial and residential rental properties has increased in urban centers such as Berlin, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Cologne, Munich, and Stuttgart. In these circumstances, it is expected that Germany will remain an attractive market for real estate investments.

Germany provides reliable political conditions, which are advantageous for a successful investment. However, there is an increasing complexity to the general legal conditions, and the success of a real estate investment strongly depends on proper structuring of the investment in a tax-efficient way.

This article provides an overview of the tax consequences of inbound investments in German real estate.

Different investment structures are compared:

• Holding the property directly,
• Holding shares in a property company, and
• Holding interests in a property partnership.

In addition to income tax, German real estate transfer tax aspects are discussed, and planning opportunities to reduce or eliminate German trade tax are explored.

Corporate Inversions Transactions: Tax Planning as Treason or a Case for Reform?

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INTRODUCTION

Anyone may soarrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the Treasury. There is not even a patriotic duty to increase one’s taxes.

– Judge Learned Hand
Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934).

To invert or not to invert: That seems to be the question many U.S. corporations are deliberating today, particularly in the context of acquisitions of non-U.S. businesses. Although the level of the political and public outcry on the “evils” of inversion transactions is a recent phenomenon, inversion transactions are not new to the U.S. business community. This article provides a perspective on the issue of U.S. companies incorporating in other jurisdictions by means of inversion transactions. It will discuss the historical context, the legislative and regulatory responses, and current events including proposed legislative developments as of the date of publication. Finally, we will offer our suggestions for a reasonable approach to the inversion issue designed to balance the governmental and the private sector concerns.

INVERSIONS: DEFINITION AND HISTORY

What is an Inversion?

An inversion transaction is a tax-motivated corporate restructuring of a U.S.-based multinational corporation or partnership in which the U.S. parent corporation or U.S. partnership is replaced by a foreign corporation, partnership, or other entity, thereby converting the U.S. entity into a foreign-based entity. In a “self-inversion,” the U.S. entity effects an internal reorganization by re-domiciling in another jurisdiction. In an “acquisition-inversion,” a U.S. entity migrates to a foreign jurisdiction in connection with the purchase of a foreign-incorporated M&A target corporation. In this latter type of inversion, the target and the U.S. entity often can be combined under a new holding company in a lower-tax foreign jurisdiction.

Insights Vol. 1 No. 7: Updates & Other Tidbits

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KENNETH WOOD NAMED ACTING DIRECTOR OF I.R.S. TRANSFER PRICING OPERATIONS

On July 24, the I.R.S. selected Kenneth Wood, senior manager in the Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement Program, to replace Samuel Maruca as acting director of Transfer Pricing Operations. The appointment took effect on August 3, 2014. We previously discussed I.R.S. departures, including those in the Transfer Pricing Operations, here.

To re-iterate, it is unclear what the previous departures signify—whether the Large Business & International Division is being re-organized, or whether there are more fundamental disagreements on how the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“B.E.P.S.”) initiative affects basic tenets of international tax law as defined by the I.R.S. and Treasury. Although there is still uncertainty about the latter issue, Ken Wood’s appointment seems to signify that the Transfer Pricing Operations’ function will remain intact in some way.

CORPORATE INVERSIONS CONTINUE TO TRIGGER CONTROVERSY: PART I

President Obama echoed many of the comments coming from the U.S. Congress when he recently denounced corporate inversion transactions in remarks made during an address at a Los Angeles technical college. As we know, inversions are attractive for U.S. multinationals because as a result of inverting, non-U.S. profits are not subject to U.S. Subpart F taxation. Rather, they are subject only to the foreign jurisdiction’s tax, which, these days, is usually lower than the U.S. tax. In addition, inversions position the multinational group to loan into the U.S. from the (now) foreign parent. Subject to some U.S. tax law restrictions, interest paid by the (now) U.S. subsidiary group is deductible for U.S. tax purposes with the (now) foreign parent booking interest at its home country’s lower tax rate.

“Inverted companies” have been severely criticized by the media and politicians as tax cheats that use cross-border mergers to escape U.S. taxes while still benefiting economically from their U.S. business presence. This has been seen as nothing more than an unfair increase of the tax burden of middle-income families.