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Netherlands: New Legislation to Combat Hybrid Mismatches

Netherlands: New Legislation to Combat Hybrid Mismatches

Late in 2023, the Netherlands parliament adopted a legislative proposal intended to significantly reduce the use of hybrid mismatch arrangements by companies operating internationally. While the legislative proposal reflects the policy of A.T.A.D. 2. – combatting hybrid mismatches – it does so through the adoption of a system to achieve uniform classification of entities on a cross border basis. Gerard van der Linden, a partner of Van Olde Tax Lawyers in Amsterdam, and Thijs Poelert, an associate at Van Olde Tax Lawyers in Amsterdam, explain the fixed method and the symmetric method for classifying foreign entities that are at the core of the law. Classification rules for certain domestic and foreign entities have been modified significantly. C.V.’s, L.P.’s, and L.L.C.’s will be treated as fiscally transparent. The new law is scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2025.

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Hybrid Mismatches: Where U.S. Tax Law and A.T.A.D. Meet

Hybrid Mismatches: Where U.S. Tax Law and A.T.A.D. Meet

When U.S. tax planners attend foreign conferences, it is not uncommon to hear pointed barbs that the U.S. is an outlier when it comes to rules enforcing “best practices” on global business transactions. However, when it comes to reverse hybrids and hybrid mismatches, the rules are not all that different on both sides of the Atlantic. Fanny Karaman and Beate Erwin compare approaches taken by ATAD 2 with U.S. tax law after the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.

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New U.S. Tax Law Adopts Provisions to Prevent Base Erosion

New U.S. Tax Law Adopts Provisions to Prevent Base Erosion

Following the lead of the O.E.C.D. and the European Commission (“E.C.”), the T.C.J.A. adopts several provisions designed to end tax planning opportunities.  In some instances, the new provisions closely follow their foreign counterparts.  In others, the provisions that are specific to U.S. tax law.  Among these changes are (i) the introduction of the G.I.L.T.I. minimum tax on the use of foreign intangible property by C.F.C.’s, (ii) the total revamp of Code §163(j) so that it reflects an interest ceiling rather than an earnings stripping provision, (iii) the restriction of tax benefits derived from the use of hybrid entities and transactions, (iv) the broadened scope of Subpart F through definitional changes, (v) legislative reversals of judicial decisions in which I.R.S. positions in transfer pricing matters were successfully challenged, and (vi) legislative reversals of a judicial decision invalidating Rev. Rul. 91-32 regarding the sale of partnership interests by foreign partner.  Sheryl Shah and Stanley C. Ruchelman discuss these provisions and place them in context. 

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O.E.C.D Targets Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements Using Branch Structures

Advisers who took comfort in the belief that the B.E.P.S. Project’s attack on hybrid mismatches did not apply to transactions between two branches of the same entity were disappointed when the O.E.C.D. released draft recommendations for domestic law that would neutralize income inclusion mismatches using branches located in different countries.  Kenneth Lobo and Beate Erwin explain that D/NI, DD, and indirect D/NI outcomes are not legitimized when branches, rather than affiliates, are used.

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Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements: The New OECD Discussion Drafts Regarding Base Erosion and Profit Shifting

Published in Journal of Taxation and Regulation of Financial Institutions, Volume 27, Number 5: May/June 2014. © Civic Research Institute. Authorized Reprint.

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Action Item 2: Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements

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On the heels of the discussion drafts issued in March, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“O.E.C.D.”) released the initial components of its plan to fight base erosion and profit shifting (the “B.E.P.S. Action Plan”). Action Item 2 addresses the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements and proposes plans to neutralize the tax deficits caused.

These responses aim to tackle the following issues created by the hybrid mismatch arrangements:

  • Reduction in overall tax revenue,
  • Unfair advantage given to multinational taxpayers with access to sophisticated tax-planning expertise, and
  • Increased expense often incurred in setting up hybrid arrangements compared to domestic structures.

This article introduces the different hybrid arrangements, looks at the proposed changes in both domestic law and international tax treaties, and discusses the ripple effect this could have if implemented.

INTRODUCTION

A hybrid mismatch arrangement is one that exploits a difference in the way an entity or instrument is taxed under different jurisdictions to yield a mismatch in total tax liability incurred by the parties. The two possible mismatches that could result are either a “double deduction” (“DD”) or a deduction that is not offset in any jurisdiction by ordinary income (“D/NI”). These mismatches are brought about by the different interpretations afforded to the entities and transactions in relevantjurisdictions. The root cause of the hybrid mismatch is that an entity may be a “hybrid entity” and an instrument may be a “hybrid instrument.” Understanding the different hybrid arrangements is instrumental to understanding the plan proposed by the O.E.C.D.

U.S.-Based Pushback on B.E.P.S.

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INTRODUCTION

In addition to the aggressive actions by some foreign countries to levy more taxes on U.S. taxpayers before a consensus has been reached, the process established by the O.E.C.D. raises serious questions about the ability of the United States to fully participate in the negotiations.

Ultimately, we believe that the best way for the United States to address the potential problem of B.E.P.S. is to enact comprehensive tax reforms that lower the corporate rate to a more internationally competitive level and modernize the badly outdated and uncompetitive U.S. international tax structure.

So say Representative Dave Camp (R) and Senator Orrin Hatch (R), two leading Republican voices in Congress, on the O.E.C.D.’s B.E.P.S. project.

Does this somewhat direct expression of skepticism represent nothing more than U.S. political party politicking or a unified U.S. government position that in fact might be one supported by U.S. multinational corporations? The thought of the two political parties, the Administration and U.S. industry agreeing on a major political/economic issue presents an interesting, if unlikely, scenario. This article will explore that scenario.

OVERVIEW OF B.E.P.S./WHY B.E.P.S.?/WHY NOW?

Base erosion and profit shifting (“B.E.P.S.”) refers to tax planning strategies that exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules in order to make profits “disappear” for tax purposes or to shift profits to locations where there is little or no real activity and the taxes are low. This results in little or no overall corporate tax being paid.